One Step Forward, Three Steps Back: TransUnion and its Implications for Standing, Separation of Powers, and Privacy Rights
Near the end of its 2020−21 term, the Supreme Court released its opinion in a seminal case known as TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez. The case is another in a long line in which the Court has developed the modern doctrine of standing. TransUnion contained two essential holdings: it confirmed that Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement cannot be satisfied by a mere showing of a statutory violation; and it requires a showing of a common law analogue to establish that the alleged intangible harm suffered constitutes an injury-in-fact. In so holding, TransUnion has three significant, negative implications: first, it reflects another step by the Court away from the original meaning of Article III standing; second, it harms the separation of powers by shifting the power to define rights and injuries away from Congress and towards federal courts; and third, it presents a serious threat to privacy rights by limiting plaintiffs’ ability to seek remedies when those rights are violated.
This Note will discuss the court’s decision in TransUnion and elaborate on these three negative implications. Part I recapitulates the Supreme Court’s holding in TransUnion. Part II discusses how TransUnion reflects the Court’s continued drift from the original understanding of Article III standing, first by offering an argument as to what the original meaning of Article III standing is, and then by explaining how the Supreme Court’s modern standing doctrine— with TransUnion being the most recent and decisive step—has moved away from that original meaning. Parts III and IV discuss two serious implications of the Court’s move in TransUnion farther away from the original understanding of Article III standing: Part III explains the separation-of-powers consequences and Part IV explores the harm to privacy rights. Finally, Part V provides some suggestions for addressing the effects of TransUnion.
