Hobby Lobby as a Land Use Case: Charting For-Profit RLUIPA Claims
Depending on whom you ask, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., is either a landmark case of a “bore.” This difference largely comes down to framing. If seen as a decision mostly construing the definition of “person” under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”), it might not appear all that remarkable. The legal fiction of treating corporations as persons is familiar. Going further, and establishing that RFRA carries this fiction to closely-held companies whose ownership have religious qualms over certain federal regulations — such as a mandate to expand contraception coverage in their employee benefits — is also not too removed from earlier cases that have allowed similar claims from non-profits. However, if regarded more as a decision that acknowledges that “religious exercise” and “commerce” can be said in the same breath, it feels far more noteworthy, perhaps even radical when one considers the parade of horribles given by some commentators, such as the specter of corporations having “Road to Damascus” conversions to escape regulation.
Regardless of these impressions, there is a question left on the table — is Hobby Lobby also a land use case? Justice Alito, the author of the majority opinion, certainly implies so. In reaching the conclusion that for-profit corporations were entitled to RFRA relief, Alito referred to its companion, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), which amended RFRA’s definition of “exercise of religion” to “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” In the eyes of the majority, this more flexible standard signaled “an obvious effort to effect a complete separation from First Amendment case law” in mediating between religious liberties and government, such that certain for-profits were entitled to religious protections. Significantly, the Court also recognized that RLUIPA “imposes the same general test as RFRA but on a more limited category of governmental actions,” implying that the only substantial difference between the two statutes is their target, and not their beneficiaries. In this way, the Court left the possibility of RLUIPA claims wide open for business owners who faced similar religious constraints in the context of land use regulations.
