Johnson v. United States and the Future of the Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine
Last Term, in Johnson v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a portion of the Armed Career Criminal Act as unconstitutionally vague. The Johnson opinion is certain to have a large impact on federal criminal defendants charged with unlawfully possessing a firearm. But it is also likely to have other important consequences. The language deemed vague in Johnson is similar or identical to language in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and other statutes. What is more, the Johnson opinion elaborates on the void-for-vagueness doctrine in important ways. Those elaborations ought to make vagueness challenges easier to win in the future.
This Commentary examines the implications of Johnson. It also briefly discusses Justice Thomas’s concurrence. Justice Thomas refused to join the majority opinion, instead opting to decide the case in Johnson’s favor on statutory construction grounds. In addition to his statutory construction analysis, Justice Thomas questioned the constitutional basis of the void-for-vagueness doctrine. Justice Thomas’s approach to the vagueness doctrine, if adopted by other members of the Court, could eviscerate the notice function of the doctrine.
When the Supreme Court first granted certiorari in Johnson v. United States, it seemed like a straightforward statutory interpretation case. Samuel Johnson had pled guilty to the federal offense of being a felon in possession of a handgun. Prosecutors sought to invoke a mandatory minimum sentencing provision of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) under which Johnson would serve at least 15 years in prison.
The ACCA imposes this mandatory minimum on certain firearm offenders who have three previous convictions for a violent felony or a serious drug felony. The term violent felony is defined to include state or federal court convictions for any felony that:
(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. . . .
