A Restriction Maybe, but is it Paternalism? Cognitive Bias and Choosing Governmental Decision Aids
In “Paternalism and Cognitive Bias,” I survey cognitive biases, and conclude that they routinely prevent us from exercising our autonomy. I argue that these obstructions can be sufficiently serious to warrant institutional intervention. Finally, I argue that in many of these cases, the institutional intervention is not paternalistic.
In this essay I address three issues that have arisen in critical response to that paper. The first concerns how to define the proper scope of interventions deemed paternalistic. The government routinely restricts our behavior by promising to sanction us if we engage in certain actions. Only the most extreme libertarian — and I hesitate even to use that dignified label for some of these objections—would regard all such constraints as paternalistic. Second, many restrictions that at first appear “paternalistic,” in that they limit a person’s range of choices “for his own good,” may not, in fact, do so “against his will”—thus raising the question of whether such restrictions are really paternalistic at all. Third, I will examine whether long-term goals should be given priority over short-term goals. I will close by considering the value of being explicit about our social priorities.
