On the Sedition Bill
I OBSERVED in my last, in the introductory remarks to the quotation from Mr. Erskine, that it might soon become necessary even in this country to understand something of the doctrine of Libel. I might have said that the time was now come, for the SEDITION LAW of 1798 has introduced among us all the principles of the English courts on the subject of Libel. We are indeed permitted to give in evidence here, the truth of any fact advanced, but opinions on the motives and conduct of our Rulers (for that is now the fashionable phrase) are still obnoxious, to indictment under that act; and the most ignorant, bigoted and subservient men of a district, may be selected to decide upon the motives and tendency of the most finished composition of the most elegant writer, the most profound politician, the most worthy and best-intentioned citizen of the country; they may find him guilty of what they cannot understand, and a court of justice appointed by the President, whose own conduct may be the subject of stricture, has the power of condemnation in fine and imprisonment, for a publication that may be most praise worthy in its motives, and most beneficial in its effects. To this state are we now reduced. However absurd and injurious to the country the laws of an influenced majority of Congress may be—however arbitrary and unconstitutional may be the acts of a President—any publication that may directly or indirectly tend to criminate the motives of such persons, is now punishable under that act; nor can any writer in future expose the conduct of arbitrary power, nor can any citizen speak of it however notorious, but under the reasonable apprehension of loss of liberty and loss of property. Much as this question has been discussed, it is impossible that any reprobation of the tendency of such a law can be ill-timed; nor do I think the public at large are at this moment aware of the mischievous importance of it.
